Red light cameras are often justified as both a safety measure and a modest source of revenue for municipalities. But in many cases, especially once costs, overhead, and enforcement complications are tallied, the balance sheet doesn’t swing in favor of the city. Several municipalities have found themselves losing money—or at least falling well short of projections—on automated enforcement programs. The 2006 blog article “City Loses Money Operating Red Light Cameras” laid out a simple but powerful caution: running cameras involves fixed costs (equipment, maintenance, legal infrastructure, staffing) and variable costs (ticket processing, adjudication, appeals). If citation rates fall, or vendor shares and legal costs eat into gross revenue, cities can end up underwater. Below are updated examples from across the United States showing how red light camera programs sometimes bleed red rather than turning red into green.
Portland, Oregon: Inconsistent Gains and Frequent Losses
Portland offers one of the most transparent public reports on red light camera financials. Under the city’s program, revenues and expenses are published, and the data reveal that the program was not reliably profitable. Over a five-year review, Portland’s red light camera program lost money in two of those years. For example, in Fiscal Year 2011–2012, revenue was $403,162 but expenses reached $500,433, meaning each citation cost the city $12.55 on net. In contrast, in FY 2012–13, revenues exceeded expenses (≈ $725,408 vs. $564,172), but even then the city’s gains were modest compared to expectations. Portland’s report even stated that “the program has not been self-supporting every year,” citing factors such as vendor costs, reduced fines, and collection lapses. Portland’s experience suggests that even in a favorable environment, red light camera systems may only break even in good years—and in some years flip into a net loss.
Dallas, Texas: Cameras Removed When They Stopped Paying Off
In some jurisdictions, red light cameras became victims of their own success: as violations dropped, revenue fell—and the city decided it could no longer justify their existence. In 2008, Dallas began disabling several of its least profitable cameras after seeing lower volumes of red-light running, estimating a $4 million revenue shortfall as a result. Other cities such as Charlotte and Fayetteville, North Carolina, reduced or eliminated red-light enforcement when state rules forced them to dedicate camera revenue to restricted purposes like education, making the program less financially sustainable. These cases highlight a perverse incentive: if cameras successfully deter violations, the revenue stream dwindles. For cities that partially depend on ticketing income, that can backfire.
Smaller Cities, Suburbs, and Unexpected Debts
While large cities attract most attention, smaller municipalities and suburban towns often suffer even more from the budgetary mismatch. In the Chicago area, suburbs such as Chicago Heights, Rolling Meadows, Evergreen Park, Burbank, and Hillside rely heavily on camera ticket revenue, but their financial stability depends on consistent citation volumes—no guarantee in a changing enforcement climate. In Suffolk County, New York, court rulings found that its $30 administrative fee added to violations was illegal. The county may have to reimburse as much as $91 million, turning what had been a source of income into a massive liability. In addition, in many jurisdictions, a significant share of issued tickets never get paid or are contested, reducing net collections. Some cities underestimate the cost of appeals, legal processing, and debt collection, which can turn a superficially profitable program into a loss leader.
Why Cities Lose Money
From these cases, certain systemic challenges emerge. Upfront and ongoing fixed costs: Cameras, data networks, legal systems, and staff impose recurring costs regardless of ticket volume. Many contracts require revenue sharing with camera vendors that erode profits. Declining citation volumes: As cameras deter red-light running, the number of violations drops. While positive for safety, this reduces income. Collection and compliance shortfalls: Not all tickets get paid; some are appealed or ignored, dragging down yield. Legal and political constraints: Some states cap fees or regulate how revenues may be used. In Suffolk County, courts ruled fees illegal, creating major liabilities. Public backlash: Opposition, court reversals, or state bans can shrink or eliminate the program, leaving cities with sunk costs. Together these factors explain why many red light camera systems become financial burdens rather than benefits.
What Research Shows About Costs and Benefits
While the financial debates are real, the safety record of red light cameras is mixed but generally positive. The Congressional Research Service notes that cameras tend to reduce right-angle crashes but can increase rear-end collisions as drivers brake abruptly. Multi-city studies suggest that camera presence is associated with lower per-capita fatal crash rates. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety found that cities which removed cameras saw about 30 % more fatal red-light crashes per capita. That said, critics argue many programs are launched for revenue, not safety. Independent audits have shown that when properly managed, the cost of cameras can exceed the monetary value of crashes prevented unless programs are targeted at intersections with high crash severity rates. In other words, they work best as safety tools, not revenue generators.
Lessons and Recommendations
Several lessons emerge for municipalities. Set conservative revenue expectations. Don’t assume early citation volumes will continue indefinitely. Track all costs. Include legal, administrative, and maintenance overhead, not just vendor payments. Separate safety from revenue goals. Programs should be judged on crash reduction, not income. Be transparent with the public. Use funds for traffic safety, education, or infrastructure to maintain trust. Ensure legal compliance. Verify that fee structures and enforcement processes follow state law to avoid lawsuits and refunds. Adapt programs as behavior changes. If violations fall sharply, consider reducing camera numbers or shifting focus to engineering solutions such as longer yellow times or improved signal timing.
Conclusion
Red light cameras can reduce dangerous violations and crashes, but from a financial perspective, they are no guarantee of profit. Cities like Portland have reported years of net losses, while others like Dallas removed cameras when they no longer paid off. Suffolk County’s program possibly turned into a massive liability after court rulings on illegal fees. The lesson is clear: safety is a valid reason to use automated enforcement, but revenue should never be the driving force. Cities that launch camera programs expecting steady profit often find that over time, the cameras cost more than they earn. Municipalities should approach these systems as public safety investments—supported by data, accountability, and transparency—rather than as cash machines that inevitably run dry.